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Abstract
We study how the availability of an abatement technology a¤ects the optimal use of polluting
exhaustible resources, and optimal climate policies. We develop a Romer endogenous growth
model in which the accumulated stock of greenhouse gas emissions harms social welfare. Since
the abatement technology allows reducing the e¤ective pollution for each unit of resource use,
extraction and pollution are partially disconnected. Abatement accelerates the optimal ex-
traction pace, though it may foster CO2 emissions for the early generations. Moreover, it is
detrimental to output growth. Next, we study the implementation of a unit tax on carbon
emissions. Contrary to previous results of the literature, its level here matters, as it provides the
right incentives to abatement e¤ort. When it is measured in nal good, the optimal (Pigovian)
carbon tax is increasing over time, while it is constant when expressed in utility. Moreover, it
can be interpreted ex-post as a decreasing ad-valorem tax on the resource. Finally, we study
the impact of the climate policy on the decentralized equilibrium: in particular, it fosters both
the intensity and the rate of carbon abatement. In the near-term, it spurs research and output
growth, while decreasing output level.
Keywords: abatement, endogenous growth, polluting non-renewable resources.
JEL classication: O32, O41, Q20, Q32
1 Introduction
The exploitation of fossil resources raises two concerns: the rst one is scarcity, because fossil re-
sources are exhaustible by nature, the second one is related to greenhouse gases (GHG) emission
associated to their combustion.
Numerous models deal with this double issue. Some of them are placed in the context of
partial equilibrium (e.g. Sinclair (1992), Withagen (1994), Ulph and Ulph (1994), Hoel and
Kverndokk (1996) or Tahvonen (1997)) whereas some others tackle this issue in general equilib-
rium growth frameworks (Stollery (1998), Schou (2000, 2002), Grimaud and Rouge (2005, 2008),
Groth and Schou (2007)). Two main questions are addressed: the socially optimal outcome on
the one hand, and, on the other hand, its implementation in a decentralized economy along with
the impacts of environmental policies. It is generally shown that postponing the resource extrac-
tion, and thus polluting emissions, is optimal. In addition, model recommendations in terms of
environmental policy are less unanimous. For instance, Sinclair (1992) advocates a decreasing
ad valorem tax on resource use, whereas Ulph and Ulph (1994), among others, show that such a
tax may not always be optimal, especially when the pollution stock partially decays over time.
Considering the sole endogenous growth models with polluting exhaustible resources, with the
exception of Schou (2000, 2002) for whom no environmental policy is required, results generally
exhibit a decreasing optimal carbon tax (see Grimaud and Rouge (2005, 2008) or Groth and
Schou (2007)). Moreover, as in Sinclair (1992), a change of the tax level only has redistributive
e¤ects and does not alter the model dynamics, e.g. neither the extraction nor the pollution
emission time-paths.
A common feature of those papers lies in the fact that, when no alternative (backstop)
energy, like solar, is considered, reducing carbon emissions necessarily means extracting less
resource. Indeed, a systematic link between resource extraction and pollution emission, in the
form of a simple functional relation (e.g. linear), is generally made. It is therefore equivalent
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to tax either the pollution stream or the resource use itself. Nevertheless, it is well known that
abatement technologies, allowing to reduce emissions for a given amount of extracted resource,
exist. In particular, the possibility of capturing and sequestering some fraction of the carbon
dioxide arising from fossil fuel combustion has recently caught a lot of attention, reinforced by its
recent demonstrated viability (for an overview, see IPCC special report (2005)). This process,
often labelled as CO2 capture and storage (CCS), consists of separating the carbon dioxide from
other ux gases during the process of energy production; once captured, the gases are then
being disposed into various reservoirs1. Despite the numerous uncertainties still surrounding
the sizable deployment of carbon capture technologies, especially with regard to the ecological
consequences of massive carbon injection, this technological option has become promising for the
fossil energy extractive industry. One important issue is that taking such abatement technology
into account partially breaks the aforementionned link between resource extraction and carbon
emissions.
Many authors have developed growth models that featured pollution and abatement. In
particular the impact of environmental policies on economic growth has been much studied; for
a survey on this question, see for instance Ricci (2007). In most of these models, pollution is a
by-product of the production, or capital, and it does not result from the use of non-renewable
resources. It is generally shown that positive long term growth is compatible with decreasing
emissions, when technical progress is fast enough. However, Gradus and Smulders (1993), or
Grimaud (1999) show that there is a trade-o¤ between environmental quality and economic
growth. Other contributions have studied the links between carbon abatement, optimal climate
policy and technical change. In particular, Goulder and Mathai (2000) show that the presence
of induced technical change generally lowers the time prole of optimal carbon taxes. Moreover,
e¤orts in R&D shift part of the abatement from the present to the future. In a close framework,
1The sequestration reservoirs include depleted oil and gas elds, depleted coal mines, deep saline aquifers,
oceans, trees and soils. Those various deposits di¤er in their respective capacities, their costs of access or their
e¤ectiveness in storing the carbon permanently.
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Gerlagh et al. (2008) study the link between innovation and abatement policies under certain
assumptions, in particular, the fact that patents can have a nite lifetime; we refer to some
of their results later in the text. In these studies, nal (or e¤ective) carbon emissions are
endogenous as there is an abatement activity with dedicated technical progress. Furthermore,
the authors use partial equilibrium frameworks in which baseline emissions are exogenous.
The present paper considers the availability of such abatement technology in the context of
a general equilibrium model with endogenous growth and a polluting exhaustible resource. Our
aim is to assess how some results of the literature recalled above, namely in terms of optimal
policy, are modied in such a framework. In particular, we study the optimal properties of the
economy, and we analyse the impact of a climate policy on the decentralized equilibrium and
the design of the optimal policy instruments.
We develop a Romer endogenous growth model in which the production of nal goods requires
the input of an extracted resource, whose stock is available in limited quantities. Furthermore,
this resource use generates polluting emissions, interpreted as GHG emissions, whose ow in
turn damages the environment - the quality index of environment is here considered as a stock.
Notice that the environment features partial natural regeneration capacity. Finally, the index
of environmental quality enters the utility function as an argument and thus allows gauging
how pollution accumulation a¤ects the welfare. But the main novelty of the model lies in the
consideration of the availability of an abatement technology, which, via some e¤ort, allows for
the partial reduction of CO2 release. Then, we distinguish between the total potential CO2
emission associated to one unit of fossil resource (referred to as total carbon content per unit of
resource in the remainder) and the e¤ective emission, i.e. the remaining pollution fraction left
after CO2 removal. The implication in terms of climate change policy is then straightforward:
the rst best outcome can only be restored by taxing the pollution but not by taxing the resource
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itself2.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. The availability of abatement technology
speeds up the optimal pace of resource extraction while relaxing the environmental constraint.
Additionally, it modies the emissions time-path of GHG. In the long term, the pollution level
decreases without ambiguity. But, if the preference for environmental quality is not high enough,
the pollution level may increase in the short-term. In this case, the following counter-intuitive
result emerges: the introduction of a carbon abatement technology leads to an increase of CO2
emissions. Lastly, the availability of such a technology is detrimental to output growth because
of the acceleration in resource extraction combined with a negative e¤ect on R&D e¤ort.
We derive the expression of the Pigovian carbon tax. Contrary to results obtained in a context
without abatement, as in Sinclair (1992) or Grimaud and Rouge (2005, 2008) for instance, the
tax level here matters and especially allows for setting the optimal abatement e¤ort level. We
give a full interpretation of this optimal tax level, we study its properties -namely the impact of
a more e¢ cient R&D sector, and we show that, though this tax is constant when it is expressed
in utility, it is an increasing function of time when it is measured in nal good. Moreover, this
tax can be expressed ex-post as a decreasing ad-valorem tax on the resource.
Finally, we study the impact of the climate policy on the decentralized economys trajector-
ies. We show that an increase in this tax fosters the intensity and the rate of carbon abatement,
while decreasing e¤ective pollution per unit of carbon content. It also leads the economy to
postpone resource extraction. In the near-term, this climate policy spurs research and output
growth, but reduces output level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model as well as the
social optimum in section 2 and we portray the decentralized equilibrium in section 3. In
2Here we assume that the regulator is able to fully measure the greenhouse gases emissions. This may not be
systematically the case: While emission data is fairly reliable in industrialized countries, collecting accurate data
on industrial activities from developing regions and deducting the emissions may prove more di¢ cult.
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section 4, we compare both market and optimal outcomes. We then characterize the optimal
policy instruments, and we analyze the e¤ects of a climate policy on the decentralized economy.
Conclusive remarks are given in section 5.
2 Model and Optimal Paths
2.1 The model
At each date t 2 [0;+1), the nal output is produced using the range of available intermediate
goods, labor and a ow of resource. The production function is
Yt =
Z At
0
xitdi

LY tR

t ; +  +  = 1; (1)
where xit is the amount of intermediate good i, LY t the quantity of labor employed in the
production sector, and Rt is the ow of non-renewable resource. At is a technological index
which measures the range of available innovations. The production of innovations writes
_At = LAtAt,  > 0; (2)
where LAt is the amount of labor devoted to research, and  is the e¢ ciency of R&D activity.
To each available innovation is associated an intermediate good produced from the nal
output:
xit = yit; i 2 [0; At]: (3)
Pollution is generated by the use of the non-renewable natural resource within the production
process. In case of no abatement, the pollution ow would be a linear function of resource use:
hRt, where h > 0: In this way, hRt can be seen as the carbon content of resource extraction or,
equivalently, as maximum potential pollution at time t. Nevertheless, rms can abate part of
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this carbon so that the actual emitted ow of pollution is
Pt = hRt  Qt; (4)
where Qt is the amount of carbon that is extracted from the potential emission ow. We
assume that Qt is produced from two inputs, the pollution content hRt and dedicated labor
LQt, according to the following Cobb-Douglas abatement technology3:
Qt = (hRt)
L1 Qt , 0 <  < 1, if LQt < hRt (5)
and
Qt = hRt, if LQt  hRt.
For any given hRt, the total cost of labor, LQt = Q
1=(1 )
t (hRt)
 =(1 ), is an increasing
and convex function of Qt. The marginal and average labor costs, respectively @LQt=@Qt =
[1=(1  )]Q=(1 )t (hRt) =(1 ) and LQt=Qt = Q=(1 )t (hRt) =(1 ), are also increasing func-
tions of Qt: The Cobb-Douglas form allows simple analytical developments. Given any quantity
of potentially emitted carbon hRt, it is the e¤ort in terms of labor only that enables pollution
abatement. Of course, one could also consider physical capital for instance; however, this would
yield further computational complexity as it would add another state variable. Our abatement
technology is such that the fraction of abated carbon, Qt=hRt, is comprised between 0 and 1.
The pollution ow is fully abated as soon as LQt = hRt45.
The non-renewable resource is extracted from an initial nite stock S0. At each date t, a
3More generally, one could have considered the technology Qt = (hRt)(LQt)1 , 0 <  < 1, if LQt < hRt=
and Qt = hRt, if LQt  hRt=, with  > 0. Here we normalize  at one.
4 In Appendix 1, we make an assumption on parameters so that this corner solution never occurs.
5Note that, contrary to Goulder and Mathai (2000) or Gerlagh et al. (2008) for instance, we do not consider
technical progress in abatement. Of course, such assumption would be more realistic, but, in this endogenous
growth framework, it would also make our computations much more complex. We leave this for future research.
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ow   _St is extracted. This implies the standard following law of motion:
_St =  Rt: (6)
In this case, there are no extraction costs, as it is the case in most endogenous growth models
with polluting non-renewable resources (see for instance Schou (2000, 2002), Grimaud and Rouge
(2005) or Groth and Schou (2007)). Such costs could be modelled here following Andre and
Smulders (2004), for instance. In this case, the ow   _St is extracted, and a proportion
Rt =   _St=(1 + t); t > 0, (7)
is supplied on the market, while   _Stt=(1 + t) vanishes, where t=(1 + t) is the unit cost of
extraction in terms of resource. We will later on denote by ^t the term _t=(1+t). ^t < 0 means
that the unit cost of extraction is decreasing over time because of technical progress that increases
exploration e¢ ciency. Conversely, ^t can be positive if we consider that exploitable reserves are
getting less accessible despite better drilling results. A consequence of such extraction costs on
the path of the resource owners rent is presented in section 4.16.
The ow of pollution (Pt) a¤ects negatively the stock of environment (Et). We assume
Et = E0  
R t
0 Pse
(s t)ds, with E0 > 0, and  is the (supposed constant) positive rate of
regeneration. This gives the following law of motion7

Et = (E0   Et)  Pt. (8)
6Our main results are obtained in the case of constant unit cost of extraction. This allows to avoid heavy
computational complexity. For general optimal solutions in the presence of extraction costs à la André and
Smulders (2004) in a model with no abatement, see for instance Grimaud and Rouge (2008). Using data on the
prices of fossil fuels over the last century, Gaudet (2007) shows that, despite high volatility, these prices remained
approximatively constant, or at most weakly increased. In our framework, this advocates for ^t  0, as we show
below (see section 3.1.2).
7As Gerlagh et al. (2008) point out, environmental dynamics in the presence of greenhouse gases are more
complex. However, such formulation is standard in the literature.
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Production ow Yt is used for consumption (Ct) and for the production of intermediate
goods:
Yt = Ct +
Z At
0
yitdi. (9)
Population is assumed constant, normalized at one, and each individual is endowed with one
unit of labor. Thus we have:
1 = LY t + LAt + LQt: (10)
The households instantaneous utility function depends on both consumption, Ct, and the
stock of environment Et8. The intertemporal utility function is:
U =
Z +1
0
[lnCt + !Et] e
 tdt;  > 0 and !  0: (11)
Note that, contrary to Aghion and Howitt (1998) for instance, the instantaneous marginal
utility of the stock of environment, !, is constant. In the case of strong damages to the envir-
onment, it may be more realistic to consider that this marginal utility is increasing (think of
catastrophic events). Nevertheless, this assumption allows simple computations in this general
equilibrium model.
2.2 Welfare
2.2.1 Characterization of optimal paths
Now we characterize the socially optimal trajectories of the economy. The results are given in
Appendix 1, where we fully depict the optimal transition time-paths of all variables in the case
of no extraction costs. The main ndings are summarized in the following Proposition 1. We
drop time subscripts for notational convenience (upper-script o stands for social optimum and
8 It would be equivalent to assume that utility is a decreasing function of the pollution stock Xt = X0 +R t
0
Pse
(s t)ds. From this expression, one gets the law of motion

Xt = (X0 Xt)+Pt and we have the following
correspondence: Xt X0 = E0 Et. In this context, we could also consider a target carbon concentration Xt  X
for all t, as an alternative to our damage function.
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gX is the rate of growth of any variable X).
Proposition 1 At the social optimum:
(i) In the case of strictly positive environmental preference (! > 0), due to the presence of
the environmental stock E, the economy is always in transition and asymptotically converges
towards the case where pollution does not matter (! = 0).
(ii) The extraction ow, Ro, decreases over time (i.e. goR < 0); moreover, strictly positive
environmental preference slows down the process. As the optimal ows of abatement (Qo) and
of pollution (P o) are proportional to Ro, they also decrease over time.
(iii) Labor in production, LoY , is constant over time. Labor in abatement, L
o
Q, is proprotional
to the ow of extraction, Ro, and thus follows the same dynamics (i.e. goLY = g
o
R). Therefore,
labor in research, LoA, increases over time and converges to 1  LoY as time goes to innity.
All optimal levels and growth rates are given in Appendix 1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
2.2.2 General comments
Let us give some comments on formulas (35)-(43) and let us rst consider the case where ! =
0, i.e., the environmental quality does not a¤ect the households utility. Here, the econony
immediately jumps to its steady-state. From (35), (36), (37) and (39), we can see that LoQt = 0,
Qot = 0 and L
o
At = 1   =(1   ): no abatement is undertaken, and the e¤orts dedicated to
production and R&D are constant. Moreover, B becomes nil and (42) implies goRt =  . Since
there is no abatement, P ot = hR
o
t (from (40)): this means that the total carbon content of each
unit of extracted resource is emitted. Hence, the growth rate of pollution is constant, as the
growth rate of extraction.
Finally, one also easily obtains from (43) that the growth rate of output, goY t; is equal to  ,
as in more general endogenous growth models with non-polluting non-renewable resources (see
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for example Grimaud and Rouge (2003)). In addition, it will be shown later that the optimal
outcome of this economy when ! = 0 is identical to the decentralized outcome of an economy
where no climate policy is implemented and research is optimally funded.
We now turn to the case where ! > 0: Contrary to the preceding case, the economy is now
always in transition. From (38), Rot also decreases over time but g
o
Rt is now greater than  : In
other words, when the environmental quality a¤ects the households utility, the social planner
postpones resource extraction (see Withagen (1994) for a similar result in a partial equilibrium
context). As LoQt, Q
o
t and P
o
t are linear functions of R
o
t , they exhibit similar dynamics: they
decrease over time and so do their growth rates. This also implies that the fraction of captured
emissions, i.e. Qot=P
o
t , remains constant over time. Note that L
o
Y is also constant over time (see
(35)). As we show in Appendix 1 (i), this results from an arbitrage condition in the allocation
of labor between production and research activity. The social optimum is achieved when a
marginal increase in labor in any of these activities entails the same increase in intertemporal
utility. Hence, the remaining ow of labor is split between abatement activity and research. As
LoQt decreases over time, L
o
At increases: as the e¤ort in abatement gets lower and lower, R&D
investment rises.
When t tends to innity, goRt = g
o
LQt
= goQt = g
o
Pt
tends to  : At the same time, LoQt
decreases down to 0, LoAt tends to 1   =(1   ) and goY t tends to    . Those asymptotic
values are identical to the ones in the steady state where ! = 0 depicted above. The resource
is asymptotically exhausted and thus the pollution ow tends to zero. That is the reason why,
at innity, the socially optimal time-path converges to the steady-state of an economy where
pollution does not matter anymore.
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2.2.3 Impact of abatement on optimal paths
In order to study the impact of carbon abatement on the socially optimal paths, we are going to
compare the social optimum with abatement (depicted above) with the social optimum without
abatement. We denote by Xo?t the optimal level of any variable Xt when no abatement tech-
nology is available - Xot still standing for the optimal value in the abatement case. We give the
optimal levels and growth rates in the no-abatement case in Appendix 2.
Proposition 2 Introducing abatement alters the optimum results as follows:
(i) Resource extraction is faster (i.e. goRt < g
o?
Rt ): more resource is extracted in the early
stages, and less in the future.
(ii) The short and long-run e¤ects on pollution may di¤er. In the short-run, the increase
in resource extraction (see (i) above) favors pollution augmentation whereas abatement activity
steers towards the opposite outcome: the overall e¤ect is ambiguous. In the long run, since
resource extraction diminishes and a part of emissions is abated, the pollution ow decreases
without ambiguity.
(iii) Economic growth is lower (i.e. goY t < g
o?
Y t ).
Standard models with non-renewable resources show that the optimal extraction is less fast
when pollution is taken into account. Here, we can see that abatement allows to partially relax
this environmental constraint. The speed up of resource extraction (goRt < g
o?
Rt ) is depicted in
Figure 1. As formulated in the above proposition, the impact of abatement on the optimal
pollution paths is less obvious. The pollution level P is equal to hR  Q. Let us rst consider
the near-term. Two opposite e¤ects drive the pollution path. An extraction e¤ect fosters hR,
and an abatement e¤ect fosters Q. One needs to know which e¤ect dominates. We have shown
in Appendix 1 that Qot = hR
o
t (!(1  )=(+ ))(1 )=. This means that, for a given Rot , the
higher !, the higher is Qot . In other words, the more the household values environment, the
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higher is the fraction of abated carbon. Hence, for high values of !; abatement is intensive,
and the abatement e¤ect tends to be the strongest. Thus pollution is lower in the abatement
case. If ! is low, i.e., the representative household is less sensitive to environmental quality, the
abatement e¤ect is low, and it is dominated by the extraction e¤ect. Thus, the introduction of a
carbon abatement technology induces higher pollution level. We thus have the counter-intuitive
case in which abatement leads to a simultaneous increase in resource extraction and pollution
in the near-term.
In the long-term, abatement unambiguously induces lower pollution. Indeed, we have shown
that extraction decreases; thus, whatever the amount of abated carbon, pollution decreases.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of these results.
Let us now turn to the e¤ect of abatement on optimal growth. First, Lo?Qt and Q
o?
t are
obviously nil. Moreover, LoY = L
o?
Y = =(1   ) (see equation (32) in Appendix 1, and
Appendix 2). This implies LoAt < L
o?
At : the amount of labor devoted to R&D is higher in the
"no-abatement case" as there is no need to use labor for abatement. So there is a rst research
e¤ect which is detrimental to growth. In addition, the aforementioned extraction e¤ect also
holds growth back. Thus, we have the following inequality: goY t = L
o
At + (=(1   ))goRt <
go?Y t = L
o?
At + (=(1   ))go?Rt , that is, carbon abatement is detrimental to economic growth.
We have seen that the amount of labor in production is unchanged by the introduction of the
abatement technology, and that resource extraction is increased in the near-term. If we consider
a su¢ ciently short period of time during which the reduced growth of knowledge does not
overcome these two former e¤ects, then the production level is fostered. Hence, in an economy
with abatement technology, early generations consume more at the optimum. In other words,
their "sacrice" is reduced.
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3 Decentralized Economy
Now that we have characterized the optimal dynamics, we study the equilibrium trajectories of
the decentralized economy. This will namely enable us to study the impacts of a climate policy
as well as to compute the optimal level of the policy tools. Since we study a Romer model,
there are two rst basic distortions with respect to the optimum: the standard public good
character of knowledge and the monopolistic structure of the intermediate sector. Moreover, a
third distortion arises from polluting emissions which damage the stock of environment. Hence
we introduce three economic tools: a unit subsidy to the use of intermediate goods, a research
subsidy, and a tax on pollution. Note that this climate policy does not consist of a tax on the
polluting resource, as in Grimaud and Rouge (2005, 2008) or Groth and Schou (2007). Indeed,
the basic externality is polluting emissions and, as abatement technology is available, a tax on
these emissions and a tax on the polluting resource are no more equivalent. As will be shown
below, this tax on carbon emissions has two main e¤ects: it leads to postponing extraction (as
in the models without abatement possibility). It also yields incentives to produce optimal e¤orts
in carbon abatement at each time t.
3.1 Agentsbehaviour
The price of the nal good is normalized at one, and wt, pit, pRt, and rt are, respectively, the
wage, the price of intermediate good i, the price of the non-renewable resource, and the interest
rate on a perfect nancial market. We drop time subscripts for notational convenience.
3.1.1 Household
The representative household maximizes (11) subject to her budget constraint _b = rb+w+  
C+T , where b is her total wealth,  represents total prots in the economy and T is a lump-sum
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subsidy (or tax). One gets the following standard Ramsey-Keynes condition:
gC = r   : (12)
3.1.2 Non-renewable resource sector
On the competitive natural resource market, the maximization of the prot functionR +1
t pRsRse
  R st rududs, subject to _Ss =  Rs, Ss  0, Rs  0, s  t, yields the standard
equilibrium Hotelling rule:
_pR
pR
= r, (13)
which states that the rent of the resources owner is equal to the interest rate. As usual, the
transversality condition is limt!+1 St = 0.
If we consider extraction costs, for instance the à la André and Smulders formulation (see
(7)), one gets _pR=pR = r+ ^. This means that if technical progress reduces the cost of access to
exploitable resource stocks, i.e. ^ < 0, then _pR=pR < r (which seems rather realistic, as shown
by Gaudet (2007), for instance); if the decrease in extraction costs is su¢ ciently fast, we can
even have _pR=pR < 0. Obviously, the reverse occurs when extraction costs increase.
3.1.3 Final sector
The nal sector maximizes the following prot function:
Y =
Z A
0
xi di

LYR
   w(LY + LQ)  pRR  h(R  h 1RL1 Q ) 
Z A
0
pi(1  s)xidi,
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where  is a unit tax on polluting emissions P (i.e., hR  (hR)L1 Q ) and s is a unit subsidy to
the use of intermediate goods. The rst-order conditions of this program are:
@Y
@xi
= x 1i L

YR
   pi(1  s) = 0, for all i (14)
@Y
@LY
= Y=LY   w = 0; (15)
@Y
@R
= Y=R  pR   h(1  h 1R 1L1 Q ) = 0; (16)
and
@Y
@LQ
=  w + h(1  )RL Q = 0: (17)
3.1.4 Intermediate and research sectors
Innovations are protected by innitely lived patents, which gives rise to a monopoly position in
the intermediate sector. The prot of the ith monopolist is mi = (pi   1)xi(pi), where xi(pi) is
the demand for intermediate good i by the nal sector (see (14)). Hence, the price chosen by
the monopolist is
pi  p = 1=, for all i. (18)
As a result, quantities and prots are symmetric. One gets
xi  x =
 
2LYR

1  s
!1=(1 )
(19)
and
mi  m =
1  

x. (20)
The market value of a patent is Vt =
R +1
t (
m
s + s)e
  R st rududs, where s is a subsidy to
research aimed at correcting the standard distortion caused by the intertemporal spillovers. Note
that Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), for instance, consider a direct subsidy to labor in research;
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our assumption alleviates computational complexity in the context of polluting non-renewable
resources and abatement. Di¤erentiating this equation with respect to time gives
r = gV +
m + 
V
, (21)
which states that bonds and patents have the same rate of return at equilibrium.
The prot function of the research sector is RD = V ALA wLA. Free-entry in this sector
leads to the standard zero-prot condition :
V =
w
A
. (22)
3.2 Equilibrium
The preceding rst-order conditions enable us to determine the equilibrium in the decentralized
economy, that is, the set of quantities, prices and growth rates at each date. All equilibrum levels
and growth rates are given in Appendix 3. As we mentionned above, the three basic distortions
concern research and polluting emissions. Recall that, in the present model, there is no directed
technical change9, in particular in the abatement technology; we do not study the links between
the climate policy and research subsidies -for such analysis in a partial equilibrium framework,
see for instance Goulder and Mathai (2000) or Gerlagh et al. (2008). In order to focus on the
climate policy, we assume here that research is optimally funded; in other words, both subsidies
s and  are set at their optimal levels (also given in Appendix 3).
For obvious reasons, it is impossible to study all types of carbon tax proles. We will limit
our analysis to a specic type. In proposition 4, we will show that the optimal carbon tax is a
linear function of Y . Then, we focus here on the impact of a climate policy consisting of a tax
growing at the same rate as output:  t = aYt (where a is constant).
9For an endogenous growth model with a stock of pollution and directed technical change, see for instance
Grimaud and Rouge (2008).
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The main ndings concerning the equilibrium are summarized in the following Proposition.
We drop time subscripts for notational convenience (upper-script e stands for equilibrium).
Proposition 3 At the equilibrium in the decentralized economy:
(i) The economy is always in transition.
(ii) The ow of resource extraction, Re, as well as the ows of abated carbon, Qe, and of
pollution, P e, decrease over time.
(iii) Labor in nal good production, LeY , is constant over time. Labor devoted to abatement
activity, LeQ, is proportional to the ow of resource extraction, R
e, and thus follows the same
dynamics: geLQt = g
e
Rt < 0. Therefore, labor devoted to research, L
e
A, increases over time and
converges to the constant level 1  LeY as time goes to innity.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Let us now consider the case in which there is no climate policy (i.e.  = 0 at each date). The
economy immediatly jumps to its steady-state, where the amount of labor devoted to abatement
is nil (see formula (45)): LeQ = 0, which means that no carbon is abated (Q
e = 0). This, in turn,
implies that the total potential emission is released in the atmosphere, i.e. P e = hRe. Moreover,
labor used in the production of the nal good, LeY , is constant, and thus labor devoted to
the research sector, LeA = 1   LeY is also constant. Here also, this property stems from an
arbitrage condition in the allocation of labor between production and research activities. The
ow of extraction at date t is Ret = S0e
 t: This implies geR =   for all t. This latter case
corresponds to the optimum without environmental preference (! = 0).
We now compare the equilibrium growth rate of resource extraction (geR) in the absence of cli-
mate policy to its optimal level. Combining the previous results with those given in Proposition
1, we obtain the following inequalities:
geR =   < goRt < go?Rt .
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Recall that go?Rt is the optimal growth rate of extraction in the case of no available abatement
technology (dened in section 2.2.3). First, geR < g
o?
Rt means that, in an economy in which no
abatement technology is available, resource extraction in the laissez-faire economy is too fast,
compared to the socially optimal path. For a similar result in a partial equilibrium context, see
Withagen (1994). Nevertheless, introducing abatement into the analysis leads to two comple-
mentary results. The inequality geR =   < goRt is an extension of the previous result: even
if abatement is possible, it is optimal to postpone extraction, relative to what is done in the
decentralized laissez-faire equilibrium. However, the inequality goRt < g
o?
Rt states that in the
case of abatement, the optimal extraction path is less restrictive than in the absence of such
technology. In other words, abatement partially relaxes the environmental constraint. As we
stated earlier, the sacrice of earlier generations is reduced.
4 Climate policy
We rst determine the Pigovian carbon tax; then we can link our results to the existing literat-
ure, in particular partial equilibrium models. Furthermore, our general equilibrium framework
enables us to study the impact of this climate policy on the economic variables (resource extrac-
tion, abatement, polluting emissions, R&D, output...).
4.1 Optimal climate policy
Comparing the optimal levels of the variables to their levels at the decentralized equilibrium
(see Appendix 1 and 3), we obtain the following result which gives the design of the optimal
(Pigovian) carbon tax.
Proposition 4 At each date t,  ot =
!(1 )
+ Yt is the level of the carbon tax that implements the
socially optimal path.
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First, note that  ot = te
t(1   )Yt, where t is the co-state variable associated to Et, the
stock of environment, in the social planner program (see Appendix 1, formula (33)). As we
commented earlier, here the tax level matters, contrary to standard results of the literature (see
Sinclair (1992), Grimaud and Rouge (2005, 2008), Groth and Schou (2007) for instance). This
comes from the fact that we have introduced an abatement option - in other words, if our model
did not feature abatement, the tax level would not matter. Indeed, when abatement technology
is available, the social planner has to give the right signal in terms of social costs of pollution
to rms, so as to induce the optimal e¤ort in abatement.
The optimal value of this carbon tax can be interpreted as follows. If we use the non-specied
expression of the utility function, U(C;E), the optimal tax is equal to 1UC
R +1
t UEe
 (+)(s t)ds.
Indeed, using (11), we can see that
R +1
t UEe
 (+)(s t)ds = !+ , and 1=UC = C = (1   )Y .
Thus, it is obvious that the optimal tax is the sum of discounted social costs of one unit of carbon
emitted at date t, for all (present and future) times, measured in nal good. This expression of
the optimal carbon tax can be linked to the ones obtained in partial equilibrium frameworks:
see for instance Hoel and Kverndokk (1996, formula (17)), Goulder and Mathai (2000, formula
(13)) or Gerlagh et al. (2008, formula (18)).
Since the abatement e¤ort results from prot maximization by rms, we also have  = (@Y=
@LY )=(@Q= @LQ). Indeed, @Y= @LY = Y=LY and @Q= @LQ = (1  )Q=LQ. Using (35), (36)
and (39), we get  o as expressed in the proposition: in this model, increasing abatement leads
to a decrease in output through a labor transfer from the nal good sector to the abatement
one. This expression of the optimal tax means that the optimal carbon tax is the cost of one
unit of abated carbon, measured in nal good10.
When it is expressed in utility, this optimal tax is equal to !=(+). First, note that it is an
increasing function of parameter !, which measures how the representative household values the
10Goulder and Mathai (2000) provide a similar expression (see equation (11) in their paper).
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environment. It is a decreasing function of the psychological discount rate : the more people
care about the present (relative to future times), the lower the optimal climate tax is, since
future environmental damages are less taken into account. This tax is also a decreasing function
of the rate of environmental regeneration, . In other words, when the environment has a higher
regeneration capacity, a given ow of pollution has less overall negative impact, which implies a
lower tax. Moreover, the tax is constant under this form, in particular because we have assumed
that the marginal utility of environment, !, is constant. However, when it is measured in nal
good, the tax increases over time and grows at the same rate as output. Indeed, economic growth
being positive, the marginal utility of consumption decreases over time. Thus, the amount of
nal good that will compensate the household for the emission of one unit of carbon increases
over time. Observe that the Pigovian tax is increasing though utility is a linear function of E; a
convex functional form would probably reinforce this result - see for instance the discussion on
this issue in Goulder and Mathai (2000, p.34).
Furthermore, the optimal carbon tax, which in particular leads the decentralized economy
to postponing resource extraction, can be interpreted ex-post as a decreasing ad valorem tax on
the resource. Here we can make a link with standard literature in the case of no abatement (see
Sinclair (1992), Grimaud and Rouge (2005, 2008) or Groth and Schou (2007)). When the optimal
tax is implemented, the "total" (i.e., including the price of the resource and the carbon tax) unit
price paid by users for the resource increases less fast than the unit price perceived by owners
of the resource -whose growth rate is the interest rate. That is why extraction is postponed.
Ex-post, this has the same e¤ect as a decreasing ad valorem tax. Indeed, the "total" price paid
by rms is pRR+  oh(R h 1RL1 Q ) = pRR

1 + ( oh=pR)(1  (LQ=hR)1 )

(see the prot
of the nal sector in section 3.1.3). Using (36) and  o = !(1  )Y=(+ ) (see the proposition
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above), this price is given by
pRR
"
1 +
 
1 

!(1  )
(+ )
(1 )=! !(1  )hY
(+ )pR
#
:
Since gY = r   and gpR = r, the ratio Y=pR decreases over time. Thus, this expression can be
written as pRR(1 + ) where  can be interpreted as an ad valorem tax on the resource, which
is decreasing over time.
Finally, an increase in , that is, the productivity of research activities, diminishes the optimal
tax level in the near term. Indeed, parameter B increases and thus goR increases (from (38) and
(42)); therefore Ro decreases in the short-term. Hence, Y o decreases, since LoY is constant and
Ao is a state-variable. Given the expression of  o in the proposition, the result is straightforward.
This means that a more e¢ cient R&D sector allows to partially relax the climate tax burden.
4.2 Impact of the climate policy
Let us now study the impact of the climate policy on the equilibrium paths of this economy.
Proposition 5 An increase in the ratio =Y has the following e¤ects:
(i) Resource extraction and carbon emissions decrease at a lower pace, and so does the e¤ort
in abatement, as well as abatement activity itself (i.e.: geR, g
e
P , g
e
LQ
and geQ increase).
(ii) The intensity of e¤ort in abatement (LeQt=Q
e
t ), the e¤ort by unit of carbon content
(LeQt=hR
e
t ), as well as the instantaneous rate of abatement (Q
e
t=hR
e
t ), all increase.
(iii) E¤ective pollution by unit of carbon content (P et =hR
e
t ) decreases.
(iv) The e¤ort in production (LeY ) remains unchanged.
(v) In the short-run, research is spurred: LeA and g
e
A both increase. Output growth (g
e
Y ) is
fostered, but the level of output (Y e) decreases.
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Assume 0  =Y  (1   )=(1   ). An increase in the ratio =Y has two basic e¤ects:
rst, pollution gets more costly, which leads the economy to postpone extraction (geRt increases).
Secondly, abatement activity becomes more protable; hence the amount of labor by unit of
carbon content (LeQt=hR
e
t ) increases. Therefore, Q
e
t=hR
e
t , that is, the instantaneous rate of
abatement also increases. Simultaneously, e¤ective pollution by unit of carbon content (P et =hR
e
t )
decreases. As abatement gets more protable, the intensity of labor in this activity (LeQt=Q
e
t )
increases.
Let us now discuss the-short term e¤ects of this climate policy on outputs level and growth.
First, as geRt increases, less resource is extracted in the early times; then, since labor devoted
to output is unchanged, output level diminishes. Second, using (45) and (48), one can show
that @LeQt=@t  0 if t is low enough, i.e., LeQ, the e¤ort in abatement, decreases in the short-
run. Then, as LeY is unchanged, L
e
A and thus g
e
A both increase. Finally, output growth, g
e
Y =
geA+(=(1 ))geR, is fostered. This contrasts with many results of the literature in the context of
endogenous growth models with environmental policy, which consider pollution as a by-product
of output or capital - for a survey on this issue, see Ricci (2007). But empirical results in
Bretschger (2007) conrm our result: increasing energy prices, and thus decreasing energy use
foster output growth.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a Romer endogenous growth model in which output is produced from a range
of intermediate goods, labor and a polluting non-renewable resource. The aim of the paper was
to study how previous results of the literature on growth and polluting non-renewable resources
are modied when a carbon abatement technology is available -think of CCS, for instance. Here,
part of the carbon ow that is emitted when the resource is used within the production process
can be abated. This implies that, contrary to standard literature, pollution is dissociated from
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resource extraction. The remaining ow of carbon damages the state of the environment, which
is harmful for households utility.
We have fully characterized the optimal trajectories. We have shown how the abatement
option speeds up the optimal resource extraction and thus helps to partially relax the environ-
mental constraint, which reduces the sacrice of early generations. Moreover, the path of GHG
emissions is modied. In the long-run, emissions unambiguously decrease, but we have proved
that pollution may increase in the near-term if environmental preferences are low. Finally, we
showed that the availability of abatement technology is detrimental to growth.
We have also studied the decentralized economy. We characterized the optimal design of a
unit tax on carbon. Here its level matters: it is equal to the sum of discounted social costs of
one unit of carbon for all (present and future) generations -taking regeneration into account.
Since abatement e¤orts are endogenously chosen by rms, it is also equal to the cost of one
unit of abated carbon. Furthermore, this Pigovian tax is an increasing function of time when it
is measured in nal good, though it is constant when expressed in utility. However, it can be
interpreted (ex-post) as a decreasing ad valorem tax on the resource: climate policy reduces the
growth rate of the "total" resource price (i.e., the resource price including carbon tax). We have
also shown that a more e¢ cient R&D sector allows partially relaxing the climate tax burden.
More generally, the climate policy a¤ects the decentralized economy as follows. It fosters
the intensity and the rate of carbon abatement while decreasing e¤ective pollution per unit of
carbon content. Moreover, resource extraction is postponed. In the near-term, research and
output growth are spurred, but output levels are lowered.
The decarbonization of the economy and the switch to renewable or non fossil fuel-based
energy remain necessary (Gerlagh (2006)). In order to keep the model tractable, the availability
of a clean and renewable energy source has not been introduced. This so-called backstop would
not drastically alter the qualitative properties of our results. Nevertheless, it would be interesting
23
to study the impact of the abatement option on the adoption timing of these alternative sources of
energy. We can infer that the possibility to abate carbon emissions would delay the introduction
of renewable energy. Indeed, the availability and use of abatement technologies may notably
encourage a shift of electricity generation from natural gas to coal-based power plants thus
favoring a coal renaissance (Newell et al. (2006)) over the next decades, while decreasing reliance
on renewable energy sources.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Welfare
The social planner maximizes U =
R +1
0 (lnCt+!Et)e
 tdt subject to (1)-(6) and (8)-(10). Here
we assume ^ = 0 for computational convenience. Moreover, we assume that [!(1  )=(+ )]1= <
1 (see equation (36)) in order to avoid a corner solution in which carbon emissions are fully
abated, i.e. LQ = hR. Thus, it is unnecessary to incorporate a Kuhn-Tucker condition for
LQ  hR. The Hamiltonian of the program is
H = (lnC + !E)e t + A(1  LY   LQ)  R+ 
h
(E0   E)  h(R  h 1RL1 Q )
i
+'

(
Z A
0
xi di)L

YR
   C  
Z A
0
xidi

;
where , ,  and ' are the co-state variables. The rst order conditions @H=@C = 0 and
@H=@xi = 0,
e t=C   ' = 0; (23)
x 1i L

YR
   1 = 0; for all i. (24)
Note that this implies xi = x, for all i. @H=@LY = 0, @H=@LQ = 0 and @H=@R = 0 yield
  A+ 'Y=LY = 0; (25)
 A+ h(1  )RL Q = 0; (26)
and   h(1  h 1R 1L1 Q ) + 'Y=R   = 0: (27)
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Moreover, @H=@A =   _, @H=@S =   _; and @H=@E =   _ yield
  _ = LA + '(xLYR   x); (28)
  _ = 0; (29)
and   _ = !e t   : (30)
i) Computation of LY .
(24) can be rewritten Y = Ax=. Since Y = C +Ax, one gets C = (1  )Y .
Dividing both hand sides of (28) by  gives  g = LA + (xLYR   x)'=. The term
between brackets can be rewritten as Y=A   Y=A, which is equal to (1   )Y=A. Moreover,
from (25), we have '= = ALY =Y and g + gA = g' + gY   gLY . Since (23) yields g'
=     gC =     gY , one gets  g = gA +  + gLY . Plugging these results in the rst
expression of  g, we obtain the following Bernoulli di¤erential equation:
_LY = ((1  )=)L2Y   LY : (31)
In order to transform this equation into a rst-order linear di¤erential equation, we consider
the new variable z = 1=LY , which implies _z =   _LY =L2Y . The Bernoulli di¤erential equation
becomes _z = z   (1   )=, whose solution is z = et [z0   (1  )=] + (1   )=.
Replacing z by 1=LY leads to LY = 1et[1=LY 0 (1 )=]+(1 )= .
Using transversality condition lim
t !+1A = 0, we show that LY immediately jumps to its
steady-state level:
LY = =(1  ): (32)
Indeed, using (25) it turns out that the transversality condition is only satised when LY =
LY 0 = =(1  ).
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The optimal level of LY results from an arbitrage in the allocation of labor between produc-
tion and research activities. The heuristic argument is the following. Let us suppose a marginal
increase of labor in production, LY t = 1; at date t. This leads to an increase in production
Yt = Yt=LY t, which yields an increase in consumption Ct = Ct=LY t. Finally one gets
Ut = Ct=Ct = =LY t: Assume now LAt = 1; at date t. This leads to an increase in know-
ledge, As, and thus in production, Ys, for all s  t. One gets Ys = (@Ys=@As   xs)As =
xs(1   )As=. Since As = A0e
R s
0 LAudu, we have dAs = AsdLAt = As, for all s  t. This
yields Ys = (1   )Ys, which gives Cs = (1   )2Ys. The increase in the instantaneous
utility at s is thus (1   ). Finally, the increase in the intertemporal utility is (1   )=.
Equating both increases in the intertemporal utility leads to LY = =(1  ):
ii) Computation of .
The solution for equation (30) is  = et(  R t0 !e (+)sds+0): Moreover, the transversality
condition associated to E writes
lim
t !+1E = limt !+1e
t
h
  R t0 !e (+)sds+ 0i hE0   R t0 Pse(s t)dsi = 0.
Normalizing E0 such that the second term between brackets is not nil, we obtain 0 =R +1
0 !e
 (+)sds; which gives  = et
R +1
t !e
 (+)sds = e t
R +1
t !e
 (+)(s t)ds
= e t
R +1
0 !e
 (+)udu. Finally, we get
 = !e t=(+ ): (33)
 is the discounted value at t = 0 of the social cost of one unit of carbon emitted at date t,
expressed in utility. This expression can be linked to the value of the optimal carbon tax at date
t, measured in nal good, in Proposition 4:  o = [!(1  )=(+ )]Y = et(1  )Y .
iii) Computation of LQ.
Using (33), (26) becomes  A + !e th(1   )RL Q =( + ) = 0. Using (23), (25) and
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(32), we get A = e t=. Plugging this result into the preceding one, we get
LQ =

!(1  )
(+ )
1=
hR: (34)
iv) Computation of R.
Using (27), (33) and (34), we obtainR = '0et+B , in whichB =
(1 )!h
+

1  

!(1 )
(+)
(1 )=
:
Using the constraint
R +1
0 Rtdt = S0, after some calculations we obtain '0 = B=(e
BS0
   1):
v) Computation of Q and P .
Plugging (34) into Q = (hR)L1 Q , one gets Q =

!(1 )
(+)
(1 )=
hR.
Then, using P = hR Q ; we have P =

1 

!(1 )
(+)
(1 )=
hR.
vi) Computation of x.
(1) can be rewritten as Y = (Ax)x 1LYR
 . Since Ax = Y and using (32), we get
x = 1=(1 )(=(1  ))=(1 )R=(1 ):
vii) Computation of growth rates.
The growth rates directly follow from the log-di¤erentiation of the preceding results.
In summary, one gets:
LoY = =(1  ); (35)
LoQt =

!(1  )
(+ )
1=
hRot ; (36)
LoAt = 1  LoY   LoQt; (37)
Rot =

'0e
t +B
; (38)
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where '0 = B=(e
BS0
   1) and B = (1 )!h+

1  

!(1 )
(+)
(1 )=
,
Qot =

!(1  )
(+ )
(1 )=
hRot ; (39)
P ot =
"
1 

!(1  )
(+ )
(1 )=#
hRot ; (40)
goAt = L
o
At; (41)
goRt = g
o
LQt
= goQt = g
o
Pt =
 
1 + (e
BS0
   1)e t
; (42)
goY t = g
o
At + (=(1  ))goRt: (43)
Appendix 2: Welfare in the no-abatement case
When no abatement technology is available, maximizing welfare leads to the following results
(recall that we denote by Xo?t the optimal level of any variable Xt in this case):
Lo?Y = =(1 ), Lo?A = 1 =(1 ), Ro?t = '?0 et+B? , g
o?
R =
 
1+B?='?0 e
t
, go?A = L
o?
A ,
go?Y = L
o?
A + (=(1  ))go?R , where '?0 = B
?
e(B
?S0=) 1 and B
? = (1  )!h=(+ ):
Appendix 3: Equilibrium
i) Computation of LY
In this paper, we focus on climate policy and its impacts on the economy. Hence we assume
that research is optimally funded; in other words, we assume that both subsidies to research, s
and , are set at their optimal levels. As in the standard case, the optimal level for the subsidy
to the demand for intermediate goods, s, is 1 . The optimal value of the subsidy to research
 is obtained in what follows.
Equation (14), in which pi(1   s) = 1 (from (18)), can be rewritten Y = Ax=. Since
Y = C +Ax, one gets C = (1  )Y , as it is the case at the optimum.
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From (12) and (21), we have r = + gC = gV + 
m+
V , where gC = gY .
From (22) and (15), after log-di¤erentiation, we get gV = gw gA = gY  gLY  gA. Moreover,
from (15), (20) and (22), we obtain m=V = (1   )AxLY =Y ; since Ax = Y , we get
m=V = (1  )LY =. Plugging these two results into the expressions of r given above yields
 =  gLY  gA+(1 )LY =+=V . It is now obvious that, if =V = gA = LA, this Bernoulli
di¤erential equation is similar to equation (31) (given in Appendix 1) and therefore has the same
solution (upper-script e stands for decentralized equilibrium):
LeY =

(1  ) : (44)
Here we can see that if research is optimally funded, then the amount of labor devoted to the
production of nal good immediately jumps to its optimal steady-state value11.
ii) Computation of LQ, Q and P .
From (15), (17) and (44), we have Y (1  )= = (1  )(hR=LQ). This yields
LeQ =

(1  )
(1  )Y
1=
hRe. (45)
Plugging (45) into (5), we get
Qe =

(1  )
(1  )Y
(1 )=
hRe. (46)
Finally, (46) and (4) yield
P e =
"
1 

(1  )
(1  )Y
(1 )=#
hRe. (47)
iii) Computation of R.
11The computation is similar to the one presented at the optimum (Appendix 1) if we use the transversality
condition of the households program.
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Basically, R is obtained from (16). In order to express R as a function of time and of
the climate policy, we need to rewrite three elements of this equation. First, LQ=hR is ob-
tained from (45). Secondly, using (12) in which gC = gY , we get Y = Y0e
R t
0 (ru )du. Fi-
nally, from (13), we have pR = pR0e
R t
0 rudu. Plugging these three results into (16) yields
Re = 
pR0et=Y0+
h
Y

1 

(1 )
(1 )Y
(1 )= , where the constant pR0=Y0 is solution of the conditionR +1
0 R
e
tdt = S0. For obvious reasons, we cannot compute this integral without assumptions on
the ratio =Y . In fact, we show later that the optimal tax grows at the same rate as the output.
Hence, in order to avoid computational complexity without limiting too much the scope of our
study, we will now restrict our analysis to the set of constant =Y . In this case, we get
Re =

 0e
t +G
, (48)
where  0 = G=(e
GS0
   1) and G = hY

1  

(1 )
(1 )Y
(1 )=
.
iv) Computation of the rates of growth.
The growth rates directly follow from the log-di¤erentiation of the preceding results. We
obtain
geAt = L
e
At; (49)
geRt = g
e
LQt
= geQt = g
e
Pt =
 
1 + (e
GS0
   1)e t
; (50)
geY t = g
e
At + (=(1  ))geRt: (51)
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